Malaysia & Nippon Insurans Bhd v Low Buck Ngoh & Anor

HIGH COURT (SEREMBAN) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–53 OF 2004
LOW HOP BING J
11 JULY 2005

Civil Procedure — Service — Service of documents — Statutory notice under Road Transport Act 1987 s 96 (2) —Whether service effective — Companies Act 1965s 350

Civil Procedure — Subordinate courts — Setting aside judgment — Summary judgment — Recovery action — Collateral issue to action — Whether allowed

Road Traffic — Insurance — Notice of proceedings — Recovery of judgment sum by person not a party to the contract — Action against insurer — Whether allowed — Road Transport Act 1987 s 96 (2)

The plaintiffs' claim against the defendant was by way of a recovery action. The plaintiffs had filed a civil action against the driver of the motor lorry involved in a motor vehicle accident and his employer. The plaintiffs' solicitors had issued a notice pursuant to s 96(2) of the Road Transport Act 1987 ('the statutory notice') by registered post, informing the defendant of the plaintiffs' intention to institute the civil proceedings as the defendant was at the material time the insurer. The driver and his employer failed to appear in court, as a result of which the court had entered interlocutory default judgment in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' solicitors had vide registered letter served a sealed copy of the interlocutory default judgment on the driver and his employer. The plaintiffs' solicitors served a copy of the judgment on the defendant, but the defendant had failed, refused and neglected to fulfil its responsibilities as the insurer and had not satisfied the judgment. Pursuant to the plaintiffs' application in the recovery action, the sessions court judge entered summary judgment against the defendant under O 26A of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 ('SCR 1980'). This was an appeal by the defendant against the decision of the learned sessions court judge.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) Section 350 of the Companies Act 1965 provided that a document may be served on a company by eg sending it by registered post to the registered office of the company, while O 7 r 15 of the SCR 1980 permitted the service of a document to be effected eg by post where a document is not required to be served personally (see para 19).

(2) On the facts, the statutory notice had been duly and legally served on the defendant and the defendant had notice of the proceedings in which

the judgment was given. As a matter of fact, the defendant had not disputed the effective service of the summons on the defendant at exactly the same address as that stated in the statutory notice (see para 20).

(3) Section 96(2)(a) of the Road Transport Act 1987 rendered an insurer who had notice of the civil proceedings such as the defendant herein liable to pay a third party who is entitled to the benefit of a judgment obtained against an insured person, by way of an exception to the doctrine of privity of contract, thereby allowing recovery of a judgment sum by a person who was not a party to the contract (see para 21).

(4) This was a recovery action by the plaintiffs against the defendant as the insurer pursuant to the judgment against the driver and his employer. The driver and his employer's application to set aside the judgment had been dismissed by the sessions court. Although there was an appeal against the judgment to the High Court, there was no order for stay of execution of the judgment. The judgment was therefore binding on the parties thereto. Any attempt to set aside the judgment must be made by the driver and his employer in the proceedings in which the judgment had been given. The defendant herein as the insurer was not at liberty to reopen it by way of a collateral issue in this recovery action (see para 24).

[**Bahasa Malaysia translation**

Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan adalah satu tindakan 'recovery'. Plaintif-plaintif memfailkan satu tindakan sivil terhadap pemandu lori yang terlibat dalam satu kemalangan jalanraya dan majikannya. Peguamcara plaintif-plaintif mengeluarkan satu notis di bawah s 96(2) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 ('notis berkanun') melalui pos berdaftar, memberitahu defendan mengenai niat plaintif-plaintif untuk memulakan prosiding sivil kerana defendan pada masa matan adalah merupakan penanggung insurans. Pemandu dan majikannya gagal hadir di mahkamah, oleh yang demikian mahkamah telah memasukkan penghakiman ingkar interlokutori yang memihak kepada plaintif-plaintif. Peguamcara plaintif-plaintif telah melalui surat berdaftar menyerahkan sesalinan penghakiman ingkar interlokutori termeterai ke atas pemandu dan majikannya. Peguamcara plaintif-plaintif juga menyerahkan sesalinan penghakiman tersebut ke atas defendan, akan tetapi defendan telah gagal, enggan dan abai untuk memenuhi tanggungjawabnya sebagai penanggung insurans dan tidak mematuhi penghakiman tersebut. Berikutan dari permohonan plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan mendapat kembali ini, hakim mahkamah sesyen telah memasukkan penghakiman terus terhadap defendan di bawah A 26A Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 ('KMR 1980'). Ini merupakan satu rayuan dari defendan terhadap keputusan yang arif hakim mahkamah sesyen.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan itu:

(1) Seksyen 350 Akta Syarikat 1950 memperuntukkan bahawa satu dokumen boleh diserahkan ke atas sebuah syarikat secara, contohnya, menghantarnya secara pos berdaftar ke pejabat berdaftar syarikat tersebut, sementara A 7 k 15 KMR 1980 membenarkan sesuatu dokumen diserahkan, contohnya secara pos di mana jika dokumen tersebut tidak perlu diserahkan secara kediri (lihat perenggan 19).

(2) Pada fakta, notis berkanun tersebut telah diserahkan secara sah di sisi undang-undang ke atas defendan dan defendan telah mendapat notis berkenaan dengan prosiding di mana penghakiman tersebut telah dimasukkan. Sebenarnya, defendan tidak mempertikaikan serahan saman ke atasnya pada alamat yang sama seperti yang tertera pada notis berkanun tersebut (lihat perenggan 20).

(3) Seksyen 96(2)(a) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang penanggung insurans yang mempunyai notis berkenaan prosiding sivil seperti mana defendan di dalam prosiding ini adalah bertanggungjawab untuk membayar pihak ketiga yang berhak mendapat manfaat di bawah sesuatu penghakiman yang dimasukkan terhadap seorang pengambil insurans, ia merupakan satu pengecualian kepada doktrin privity kontrak, dan membenarkan seseorang yang bukan merupakan satu pihak kepada kontrak mendapat kembali jumlah penghakiman (lihat perenggan 21).

(4) Ini merupakan satu tindakan 'recovery' yang diambil oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan sebagai penanggung insurans berikutan dari penghakiman terhadap pemandu tersebut dan majikannya. Permohonan pemandu tersebut dan majikannya untuk mengetepikan penghakiman tersebut telah ditolak oleh mahkamah sesyen. Walaupun terdapat satu rayuan terhadap penghakiman tersebut di Mahkamah Tinggi, tiada perintah dibuat untuk menangguhkan perlaksanaan penghakiman. Oleh yang demikian penghakiman tersebut mengikat pihak-pihak. Sebarang percubaan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman mestilah dibuat oleh pemandu dan majikannya. Defendan sebagai pengambil insurans tidak boleh membukanya sebagai isu kolateral di dalam tindakan 'recovery' (lihat perenggan 24).]

Notes

For a case on setting aside judgment, see 2(2) *Mallal's Digest* (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) para 2643.

For cases on notice of proceedings, see 11 *Mallal's Digest* (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 196–197.

For cases on service of documents, see 2(2) *Mallal's Digest* (4th Ed, 2004 Reissue) paras 2194–2201.

Cases referred to

Chartered Bank, The v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 (refd)
Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 (refd)
Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v Rusnah Abd Raop [2003] 6 MLJ 113 (refd)
Pembinaan KSY Sdn Bhd v Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 100 (refd)
Rafiah bte Bakar v East West-UMI Insurance Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 39 (refd)
Talasco Insurance Bhd (formerly known as Talasco Insurance Sdn Bhd) v Qoh Thiam Hock [1999] 1 MLJ 179 (refd)

Legislation referred to

Companies Act 1965 s 350
Road Transport Act 1987 s 96(1), (2)(a)
Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 O 7 r 15, O 26A

Appeal from: Summons No 52–224 of 2003 (Sessions Court, Seremban)

KB Tan (KB Tan, Kumar & Partners) for the plaintiffs.
M Nathan (Lawrence Pereira & Partners) for the defendant.

Low Hop Bing J:

I APPEAL

[1] This is an appeal by the appellant-defendant ('the defendant') against the decision of the learned sessions court judge who had on 4 June 2004 entered summary judgment in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs ('the plaintiffs') under O 26A of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980.

[2] For brevity and convenience, a reference hereinafter to an order and a rule is a reference to that order and rule in the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 and a reference to a section is a reference to that section in the Road Transport Act 1987 unless otherwise stated.

II FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[3] The plaintiffs' claim against the defendant is by way of a recovery action.

[4] Vide Seremban sessions court Summons No 53–541 of 2001 dated 29September 2001, the plaintiffs had filed a civil action against one Jaes bin Abdullah as the driver of the motor lorry involved in a motor vehicle accident on 6 October 1998, and his employer Bina Bumi Construction ('the civil proceedings').

[5] The plaintiffs' solicitors had on 10 September 2001 issued a notice pursuant to s 96(2) of the Road Transport Act 1987 ('the statutory notice') by registered post, informing the defendant of the plaintiffs' intention to institute the civil proceedings as the defendant was at the material time the insurer.

[6] The plaintiffs' summons was fixed for mention for 9 November 2001 but it had to be postponed as the sessions court judge was on leave and it was rescheduled for 6 December 2001 for further mention. The plaintiffs' solicitors had vide registered letter dated 16 November 2001 notified the driver and his employer of the new mention date ie 6 December 2001.

[7] However, on 6 December 2001, the driver and his employer failed to appear in court, as a result of which the court has entered interlocutory default judgment in favour of the plaintiffs.

[8] The plaintiffs' solicitors had vide registered letter dated 7 February 2002 served a sealed copy of the interlocutory default judgment on the driver and his employer. That judgment had stated, *inter alia*, that the assessment of damages had been fixed for 20 February 2002 but the driver and his employer did not attend; and assessment was proceeded with. After hearing, damages, interest and costs had been awarded on 12 July 2002 in favour of the plaintiffs, as at pp 60 to 63 of the appeal record ('the judgment').

[9] As the defendant was at the material time the insurer, the plaintiffs' solicitors had on 11 November 2002 served a copy of the judgment on the defendant, but the defendant had failed, refused and neglected to fulfil its responsibilities as the insurer and had not satisfied the judgment.

[10] On 4 June 2004, pursuant to the plaintiffs' application in the recovery action, the sessions court judge entered summary judgment against the defendant under O 26A.

III NOTICE TO INSURER

[11] Mr M Nathan, learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that the plaintiffs' solicitors have not sent and could not have sent the statutory notice by registered post or otherwise to the defendant and that the defendant hadnot received it, in which case the defendant is not liable to satisfy the judgment.

[12] For the plaintiffs, learned counsel Mr KB Tan responded that the plaintiffs had complied with s 96(2)(a) by giving the defendant the statutory notice, thereby relying on s 350 of the Companies Act 1965 and O 7 r 15.

[13] The issue for determination in this respect is whether the defendant has notice of the civil proceedings in which the judgment was given.

[14] Upon a proper perusal of the statutory notice, I find that it had been sent by registered post and addressed to the defendant at Level 25, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur. The posting receipt had also been exhibited.

[15] There was no submission by the defendant that this address was not the registered office of the defendant. In fact the defendant's statement of defence admitted that this is the defendant's registered office.

[16] Section 96(1) provides generally for the duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks. It is significant to note that s 96(2)(a) specifically creates an exception unless the insurer had notice of the proceedings. Section 96(2)(a) reads as follows :

> (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-s (1):
>
> (a) in respect of any judgment, unless before or within seven days after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment was given, the insurer had notice of the proceedings;

[17] For the purpose of determining whether the defendant herein has notice of the civil proceedings,

[18] I find it useful to refer to s 350 of the Companies Act 1965; and O 7 r 15.

[19] Section 350 of the Companies Act 1950 where relevant provides that a document may be served on a company by eg sending it by registered post to the registered office of the company, while O 7 r 15 permits the service of a document to be effected eg by post where a document is not required to be served personally.

[20] On the facts, there can be no doubt in my mind that the statutory notice had been duly and legally served on the defendant and that the defendant had notice of the proceedings in which the judgment was given. Asa matter of fact, the defendant has not disputed the effective service of the summons on the defendant at exactly the same address as that stated in the statutory notice. That being the case, the sessions court judge is correct in rejecting the defence submission to the contrary.

[21] Section 96(2)(a) renders an insurer who had notice of the civil proceedings such as the defendant herein liable to pay a third party who is entitled to the benefit of a judgment obtained against an insured person, by way of an exception to the doctrine of privity of contract, thereby allowing recovery of a judgment sum by a person who is not a party to the contract. (See also *Rafiah bte Bakar v East West-UMI Insurance Bhd* [1993] 1 MLJ 39 at p43G–H, per James Foong J (now JCA); *Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v Rusnah Abd Raop* [2003] 6 MLJ 113 at p 120G–H, per Kang Hwee Gee J; and *Talasco Insurance Bhd (formerly known as Talasco Insurance Sdn Bhd) v Qoh Thiam Hock* [1999] 1 MLJ 179 at p 185 D–G, per Suriyadi J).

A IV NEGLIGENCE OF DRIVER

[22] It was argued for the defendant that the driver of the motor lorry had not been negligent at all and so there were merits in the defence case.

[23] The stand taken for the plaintiffs is that the driver and his employer had never applied to set aside the judgment.

[24] In my view, it is to be observed that this is a recovery action by the plaintiffs against the defendant as the insurer pursuant to the judgment against the driver and his employer. The driver and his employer's application to set aside the judgment had been dismissed by the sessions court. Although there was an appeal against the judgment to the High Court Seremban, there was no order for stay of execution of the judgment. In my view, the judgment is binding on the parties thereto. Any attempt to set aside the judgment must perforce be made by the driver and his employer in the proceedings in which the judgment had been given. The defendant herein as the insurer is not at liberty to reopen it by way of a collateral issue in this recovery action.

[25] In *Pembinaan KSY Sdn Bhd v Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd* [1991] 1 MLJ 100, the then Supreme Court held that a default judgment until set aside is a good and enforceable judgment: per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (M) (as he then was).

[26] More importantly, it is trite law that the parties' pleadings are binding on them: see eg *The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan* [1974] 1 MLJ 157; and *Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat* [1971] 2 MLJ 196. In order to ensure that there is no deviation from the pleadings, it is necessary for me to examine the amended defence filed for the defendant. Upon an analysis thereof, I am unable to find any averment whatsoever in relation to the absence of negligence on the part of the driver. It is not permissible for the defendant to travel outside the amended defence and there is no necessity for me to consider this unpleaded issue.

V CONCLUSION

[27] The defendant's submission has raised no triable issue at all. I hold that the sessions court judge is correct in entering summary judgment for the plaintiffs, which I now affirm. As the defendant's appeal is devoid of merits, it is hereby dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Reported by Peter Ling